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The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense
in Tort and Criminal Law, Grammatically-
Correct Originalism, and Other Second
Amendment Musings
ALAN BROWNSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
When I was asked to participate in this Symposium on the Second
Amendment after Heller, I had mixed feelings as to whether or not I
should accept the invitation. I have not focused on the meaning of the
Second Amendment in my research. Further, as a constitutional and
policy matter, I remain conflicted about the underlying issues
surrounding gun control laws and the right to bear arms. Put simply, I did
not have a horse in this race based on either specific expertise or policy
predilection.
However, I thought that the Heller opinion was interesting,
provocative, and disturbing in more than enough ways to justify an essay
on the decision and its aftermath, so I agreed to write this piece. While
there are more critical comments than positive ones in this short Article,
none of them go to the core of the substance of the Heller decision. On
the basic question of the meaning of the Second Amendment, I reserve
judgment.
I. IDEOLOGICAL SLOTH AND CONFUSION
Over the last fifteen to twenty years, the Court has decided several
highly controversial cases with strong ideological overtones that can only
be described as doctrinal disasters. It is not so much that the holding in
each case is persuasive or unpersuasive as to its reasoning, good or bad in
normative terms, or right or wrong according to a particular
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methodology for interpreting the Constitution. The problem is that the
Court either ducks the critical issue, ignores the doctrinal consequences
of its decision by failing to provide a critical part of the analysis, or
answers key doctrinal questions with such convoluted or obscure answers
that no one has any idea how the holding is to be applied in future cases.
I do not know if there is a common explanation for the doctrinally
inadequate job the Court does in these cases. Whatever the explanation
might be, the Court deserves substantial criticism for failing to perform
its supervisory role in providing critical guidance to hundreds of lower
federal courts and state courts struggling to interpret the United States
Constitution.
The decisions described below are only examples. Unfortunately,
many other opinions could easily be added to the ones I mention. These
examples ought to be enough, however, to make my point. Consider
three cases: In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court caused
considerable confusion by failing to explain how strict scrutiny should be
applied when members of protected minority groups are excluded
because of their race, gender, nationality, religion, or sexual orientation
from associations such as the Boy Scouts, the Little League, or religious
summer camps.' No attempt was made to explain whether prior freedom
of association cases such as Roberts v. United States Jaycees' were still
good law or on what basis they could be distinguished from Dale's
reasoning and holding.
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down laws prohibiting
homosexual sodomy under rational basis review.' In doing so, it
appeared to apply a more rigorous standard of review reserved for laws
abridging fundamental rights, while insisting that it was not doing so.4
Instead, rational basis review, which is deferential to the point of being
nonfatal in fact in virtually all other cases, suddenly and somehow,
without plausible explanation, was demanding enough to justify striking
down morality-based criminal laws.'
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, in order to strike down a hate speech
ordinance, the Court announced for the first time that content-
discriminatory regulations within a category of unprotected speech, such
as fighting words, must be reviewed under strict scrutiny.6 Confronted
with the reality that a broad range of laws would be subjected to
constitutional challenge and struck down under this unprecedented
I. 530 U.S. 640 (20oo).
2. 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
3- 539 U.S. 558,577 (2003)-
4. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1893, 1917 (2004).
5. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992).
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holding, the Court manufactured a laundry list of poorly conceived and
described exceptions to try to contain the damage it had done.'
In my judgment, the majority opinion in District of Columbia v.
Heller deserves to join this list. The problem with the opinion, of course,
is that it does not provide adequate answers to the three critical
questions that have to be addressed whenever a fundamental right is
recognized under the Constitution: (i) what is the nature and scope of
the right, (2) what constitutes an infringement of the right, and (3) what
constitutes an adequate justification for the right?9
The majority opinion describes the right to keep and bear arms as
essentially the right to have a firearm available for immediate self-
defense purposes.'0 That is a start to defining the nature and scope of the
right. It identifies the right almost exclusively in instrumental terms,"
thus implicitly distinguishing it from rights that have a dignitary
dimension as well as an instrumental purpose, such as freedom of speech
and the exercise of religion. I" But then the Court goes on to identify what
it describes as limitations on the right. 3 This is a nonexhaustive list of
situations where the right does not apply either because of the location
where the weapon is carried, the nature of the weapon, the identity of
the individual asserting the right, or the manner in which the firearm is
carried. 4
It is not altogether clear whether these are intrinsic limitations on
the scope of the right or whether they describe justifications for
abridging the right. This is a critical distinction because these limitations
clearly cover situations where there plausibly could be a need or a
justification for carrying a weapon for self-defense purposes. If these
limitations are understood to reflect justified restrictions on the exercise
of the right, that is, circumstances where the risk to the public good
outweighs the value of the right, then these limitations might provide a
court some basis for determining whether other restrictions on the
exercise of the right could be similarly justified. The Court, however,
seems to suggest that the list is grounded in historically recognized
7. Id. at 387-90.
8. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
9. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 794-97 (3d ed.
2006); Alan E. Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 867-70 (1994).
Io. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818-19, 2821-22.
II. See id.
12. Vikram Anar & Alan E. Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REV,
915,918 (1998).
13. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17.
14. Id.
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exceptions to the scope of the right without any serious attention
directed at the reasoning underlying the exceptions.'5
The problem here, of course, is that fundamental rights doctrine in
contemporary constitutional law is not grounded in historical
applications of the right. The complex doctrinal framework that has
developed for interpreting freedom of speech or the equal protection of
the laws, for example, bears little resemblance to a list of historical
exceptions and applications. Fundamental rights today are understood
to involve a multi-tiered system of review.'7 As the Second Amendment
now stands, every case that falls outside the parameters of the Heller
holding will require an historical analysis of the sco pe of, and exceptions
to, the right to bear arms for self-defense purposes.
The Court does a much worse job in discussing what constitutes an
infringement of the right. It holds that a ban on handguns in the home is
unconstitutional even if homeowners are permitted to possess rifles and
shotguns for self-defense purposes.'9 The primary justification for this
conclusion is that handguns are more popular than other weapons for
home defense purposes.0 Here, mysteriously, history no longer appears
to be relevant. Certainly, there is no discussion of whether handguns
were more popular than long guns in 1791 for self-defense purposes, or
even whether handguns were commonly employed for the defense of the
home in colonial America. Nor is it entirely clear why the current
popularity of a particular means of self-defense determines whether its
prohibition constitutes an infringement of an instrumental right, when
15. Id.
16. For a recent example illustrating this point we need only look to the Court's recent decision in
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2oo7), a case involving the free speech rights of students attending
public schools. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a long concurring opinion detailing why he believed
that the original understanding of the Free Speech Clause did not protect the expressive activities of
public school students. Id. at 2629-36 (Thomas, J., concurring). The other members of the Court,
immersed in the doctrinal framework applied to student speech cases, did not even bother to respond
to his arguments.
17. See Brownstein, supra note 9, at 893-94.
18. Nor is it entirely clear whether the exceptions cavalierly recognized in Heller should be
applied without further analysis. The recognized prohibition against allowing felons to possess
firearms may have made much more sense in the past when the number of felonies was relatively
limited. See Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 187 (Ky. 2006) (Scott, J., concurring and
dissenting in part). In the modem regulatory state, an astonishingly long list of infractions are
identified as felonies. Many of them bear little, if any, relationship to whether the individual convicted
of such a crime should be denied the right to possess a firearm for self-defense purposes for his or her
entire life. See, e.g., id. For an exhaustive discussion of whether the right to keep and bear arms
guaranteed by a state constitution permits the legislature to prohibit felons from possessing firearms,
see State v. Hirsch, 114 P.3d 1104, 1107-36 (Or. 2003). For a scathing critique of the Heller majority's
suggestion that the exceptions to the right to keep and bear arms that it identifies are grounded in the
original understanding of the Second Amendment, see Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller,
and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1343 (2oo9).
19. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2858.
20. Id.
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there are arguably equally effective means for accomplishing the right's
function, while reducing the risk and cost of the exercise of the right to
the general public.2'
Moreover, the primary regulation the Court strikes down involved a
total ban of handgun possession in the home." What if a regulation does
not involve an outright ban of firearms in the home, but increases the
cost of obtaining a gun or otherwise burdens an individual's ability to
acquire and possess a firearm? We are told absolutely nothing about
what kind of burdens on the possession of firearms, short of a total ban,
infringe the Second Amendment and require justification. 3
The Court also strikes down a regulation impeding the use of a
firearm for home-defense purposes. It holds that the District's
requirement of a trigger lock is unconstitutional.' In part, the Court acts
as if this requirement would continue in effect even if the homeowner
confronted an intruder in his or her home." Thus, it would be illegal to
unlock the trigger lock and use the weapon for self-defense purposes
even when a homeowner was subject to assault." I think that is an
implausible interpretation of the ordinance, but I have no doubt that
such a law constitutes an infringement of the right as the Court has
described it. Later in the opinion, however, without further discussion,
the Court states that it violates the Second Amendment for government
to prohibit individuals from having a "lawful firearm in the home
operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense."27 That sounds as if
the Court is suggesting that a law would still be unconstitutional if it
required a trigger lock on weapons-but explicitly provided that the lock
could be removed in circumstances justifying the use of the firearm for
self-defense purposes-because of the delay involved in making the
weapon operable.
That interpretation of the Second Amendment raises several
questions. Once again, if history is to be our guide, we might want to
know just how immediately weapons were available for home-defense
21. See Brownstein, supra note 9, at 908-25.
22. See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01, 7-2502 (2001).
23. Determining the scope of, and exceptions to, state constitutional provisions guaranteeing the
right to keep and bear arms has proven to be a daunting task. Some state constitutional provisions
employ very broad language. New Mexico, for example, protects the right to keep and bear arms "for
security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes." State v.
Dees, 669 P.2d 261, 262 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting N.M. CoNsT. art. II, § 6). But a New Mexico
court still determined that this constitutional provision allows the state legislature to prohibit carrying
a firearm into a licensed liquor establishment. Id.
24. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818.
25. See id. at 2717-18.
26. See id. at 2818.
27. Id. at 2822.
28. See id.
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purposes in the 1780s. Was it feasible or commonplace to have weapons
loaded with powder and ball in one's home? If not, does it take longer to
unlock a trigger lock today than it would to load a pistol or musket 220
years ago?29
More importantly, the risks of misuse resulting from an unlocked
loaded firearm being stored at home in a place where it would be
available for "immediate" access-such as the risk that a child or an
intoxicated individual might gain access to the weapon-are far greater
than the risks that an inappropriate person, such as a child, might gain
control of a firearm during the brief period when the owner, under threat
of assault or home invasion, was loading a weapon and disabling its
trigger lock. Is the Court suggesting that any regulation intended to limit
children's access to loaded operable firearms in the home infringes the
Second Amendment if it causes any delay in the availability of the
firearm for self-defense purposes? ° The Heller opinion gives us no basis
for answering such questions.
This issue leads, of course, to the Heller opinion's primary weakness:
its failure to suggest what standard of review should be used to evaluate
state attempts to justify infringements of the Second Amendment.' This
is simply indefensible. The majority says two things about the standard of
review to apply in Second Amendment cases. First, it states that "[u]nder
any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights, banning from the home 'the most preferred firearm
in the nation to "keep" and use for protection of one's home and
family' would fail constitutional muster."32 Second, it rejects Justice
Breyer's interest-balancing analysis by arguing that "[w]e know of no
other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been
subjected to a freestanding 'interest-balancing' approach."33 I am not
fully convinced of the accuracy of the first statement. Even if it is
accurate, that conclusion is not so self-evident that it can be asserted
without any analysis to support it. As to the second statement, if it is
accurate,' it may have significant repercussions for the way self-defense
is understood in tort law and criminal law-an issue I will discuss later in
this Article.3"
29. See infra Part II. C.
30. See infra Part III.A.
3r. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The [Heller] decision will encourage legal
challenges to gun regulation throughout the Nation. Because it says little about the standards used to
evaluate regulatory decisions, it will leave the Nation without clear standards for resolving those
challenges.").
32. Id. at 2817-18 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Parker v.
District of Columbia, 478 F.3 d 370,400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
33. Id. at 2821.
34. I have strong doubts that this statement is accurate as well.
35. See infra Part III.B.2.
June 2o09] THE CONSTITUTIONALIZA TION OF SELF-DEFENSE
Let us focus on the first statement. Are there any standards of
review applied to enumerated rights that provide a legitimate argument
for upholding the District's ordinance banning possession of a handgun
in one's home? One possibility is the standard of review the Court
applies to content-neutral speech regulations. This standard has been
accepted for decades and it clearly applies to laws that burden an
enumerated right by interfering with a speaker's ability to communicate
his message to an intended audience. 6 While the standard is far less
rigorous than strict scrutiny review,37 it involves the analysis of three
factors: (i) the importance of the state's interest, (2) the availability of
alternative avenues of communication, and (3) a tailoring requirement to
insure that the law does not burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to achieve the state's objective. 38
Does the District's ordinance prohibiting the possession of handguns
in the home and the trigger locking of lawful weapons serve an important
governmental interest? Justice Breyer's dissent identifies a variety of
goals that would certainly be considered important under a conventional
doctrinal analysis.39 Public safety, reducing crime, avoiding accidental
injuries and deaths resulting from children gaining access to firearms,
and limiting teenage suicides are all interests that the District could
legitimately assert in defense of its ordinance.4'
What about the availability of alternative ways to exercise the
right-here the right to bear arms in self-defense or more generally the
right to defend one's person and property against assailants or intruders?
The Court lists several reasons why a homeowner might prefer to have a
handgun available for self-defense purposes and it notes the popularity
of handguns for personal security and home protection.' But it is at least
an open issue if these kinds of arguments would be persuasive if the First
Amendment were the constitutional provision at issue rather than the
Second.
For the most part, the Court has not seemed to care whether the
time, place, or manner of speech restricted by content-neutral
regulations was particularly popular or not. The use of loud speakers,"
soliciting on public property,43 and posting signs on utility poles" are
36. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1968).
37. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 n.6 (1989).
38. See id. at 798-99; Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,481-82 (1988).
39. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2854-65 (20o8) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4o. Id.
41. Id. at 2818 (majority opinion) (listing ease of storage, accessibility in an emergency, and case
of use for individuals who lack upper body strength among reasons why handguns are preferable to
long guns).
42. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1949).
43. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 643-44 (598I).
44. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 8io (1984).
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popular means of communicating, but the Court has upheld restrictions
on all three of these vehicles for expression.45 Similarly, arguments about
the special utility of locations for speech purposes have not persuaded
the Court to strike down content-neutral speech regulations. 6 There is
no doubt, for example, that the areas in front of clinics providing
abortion services are uniquely effective locations for anti-abortion
protestors and sidewalk counselors to communicate with women
planning to have abortions, but that reality did not convince the Court to
strike down content-neutral regulations of expressive activity in this
area.7 Nor could anyone doubt that the areas proximate to the polls on
election day are especially useful locations for the communication of
political campaign messages, but the Court upheld a content-
discriminatory regulation of political speech in this location, 8
If we shift the analysis from traditional public forums to nonpublic
forums, the lack of concern about the utility (or popularity) of a location
for speech purposes is even more obvious and extreme. The Court has
upheld restrictions on soliciting in airports49 and the interior sidewalks
leading to post offices," on political speech trying to reach military
personnel on military bases,' on advocacy groups seeking donations as
part of a federal workplace charity drive, 2 on a candidate seeking to
participate in a candidates' debate, 3 and on a union's access to the intra-
school mail system available to the rival union contemporaneously
representing school district employees." There can be little doubt that
these locations were often the preferred and most effective locations for
the speech in question, but either content-neutral or content-
discriminatory restrictions on expression were upheld under a
"reasonableness" standard of review in each case.55
If we apply the criterion evaluating alternative avenues of
communication to the District's prohibition against possessing a handgun
in one's home, we would have to ask whether the law permits alternative
avenues for using firearms to protect one's person and property6 or,
45. Id.; Heffron, 452 U.S. at 634-44; Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87-88.
46. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729-30 (2000); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 210
(1992).
47. Hill, 530 U.S. at 729-30.
48. Burson, 504 U.S. at 210.
49. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,683-85 (I992).
5o. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737 (199o).
51. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,838-40 (1976).
52. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808-09 (1985).
53. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998).
54. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,50-54 (983).
55. See supra notes 49-54.
56. In reviewing statutes banning certain assault weapons, some courts have upheld the
restrictions against state constitutional challenges asserting a right to keep and bear arms for self-
defense purposes by arguing, in part, that the ban does not violate the constitutional guarantee
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alternatively, whether it permits alternative, but effective, means of self-
defense which do not require the use of firearms. As to the first question,
rifles and shotguns are an obvious alternative to handguns. If we use free
speech cases as analogies, neither the alleged utility nor the popularity of
handguns would be dispositive factors. An argument can certainly be
made that long guns are less adequate alternatives for self-defense
purposes than handguns, but if the free speech cases are our guide, it is
certainly an open question as to how rigorously courts will evaluate the
adequacy of alternatives. If the question is expanded to include
alternatives other than firearms, then a range of home protection
approaches ranging from alarm systems to dogs would have to be
considered as well.
As to the narrow tailoring requirement, this is a fairly weak standard
that requires only a moderate connection between means and ends.
There is language in Ward v. Rock Against Racism that suggests that as
long as the challenged law is more effective in furthering the state's
interests than any of the regulatory alternatives available to the
legislature, the Court will uphold the content-neutral law against a
petitioner's free speech claim. 7 That language may overstate the Court's
actual approach to this part of the test. It is hard to believe, for example,
that the Court would uphold a law that is only marginally more effective,
but dramatically more burdensome to speech, than alternative
regulations. But even this more rigorous interpretation still describes a
relatively lenient standard of review."
because "the ban does not cover a significant percentage of firearms that continue to be available for
citizens to possess" for self-defense purposes. See Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1235 (Conn.
1995); see also Robertson v. City & County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 333 (Colo. I994). The availability
of alternative weapons for self-defense has been discussed in other circumstances as well. See, e.g.,
Webb v. State, 439 S.W.2d 342,343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (explaining that restricting a felon's ability
to carry firearms does not offend the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense purposes protected
by the state constitution "because appellant might have armed himself with any other weapon not
prohibited in the article"). In one interesting case, the defendant was prosecuted for violating a
Colorado law declaring it to be unlawful for an alien to hunt or kill any wild bird or animal in the state
"and to that end" also declaring it to be unlawful for an alien to own or possess a firearm. People v.
Nakamura, 62 P.2d 246, 246 (Colo. 1936). The defendant was arrested carrying a shotgun and three
pheasants he had killed. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the second part of the statute
violated the Colorado constitutional provision guaranteeing residents the right to bear arms in defense
of home, person, and property, and could not be applied against the defendant. Id. at 247. Two
dissenting justices argued, however, that if the defendant had other firearms available to him in his
home for self-defense purposes and used his shotgun for hunting purposes, the statute could be validly
applied against him. Id. at 247-48 (Bouck, J., dissenting).
57. 491 U.S. 781, 798--800 (1989).
58. It is worth noting that the more rigorous understanding of the tailoring requirement would
involve the Court in the exact kind of interest balancing that the majority opinion in Heller insists is
never a part of fundamental-rights jurisprudence. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
2821 (2008).
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Applying this factor to the D.C. ordinance may be problematic. One
could certainly argue that there are alternatives to a total ban on having
a handgun in one's home for furthering many of the state's gun control
objectives." The trigger lock requirement is easier to justify. If the state's
objective is to prevent children from obtaining access to loaded firearms
(an obviously legitimate and important state interest), it is hard to see
how this goal could be furthered without imposing some burdens on a
weapon's availability for immediate self-defense. The District's
ordinance could be amended to require the unloading and locking of
weapons in one's home whenever there was any serious likelihood that
children would visit. That is a more narrowly tailored law, but it still
imposes substantial burdens on the individual's right to keep and bear
arms for self-defense purposes.
The Court does suggest in certain free speech cases that the home is
a uniquely important location both as a sanctuary where individuals may
be free from intrusive communications they do not want to receive and
as a site for the homeowner's expression." The Court's opinion in City of
Ladue v. Gilleo, which struck down a law prohibiting homeowners from
displaying signs on their property, emphasized the "special respect"
owed to the home as a site for individual expression.6' It also examined
the three factors described above with more rigor than it usually applies
in reviewing content-neutral laws.62 Perhaps by focusing on the special
status of the home as a unique location for the exercise of the right to
bear arms for self-defense purposes, a court could strike the District's
laws down under the standard of review described above. That
conclusion does not seem so self-evident to me, however, that it excuses
the Court from engaging in the requisite analysis.
II. HELLER AND ORIGINALISM
A large part of the majority opinion in Heller is grounded in an
original-intent or original-understanding interpretation of the Second
Amendment. 63 Pursuant to that analysis, the Court concludes that the
Second Amendment protects the individual right to keep and bear
handguns in one's home for the purpose of immediate self-defense.
64
Both the District of Columbia's ban on handgun possession in the home
59. In free speech cases, the Court has frequently expressed reservations about total bans "that
foreclose an entire medium of expression." See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43,55 (1994).
6o. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept.,
397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
61. 512 U.S. at 58.
62. See Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43
63. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788-812.
64. Id. at 2788-802.
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and its requirement that permissible weapons be unloaded and
disassembled or trigger locked are found to violate this right.65
The obvious obstacle to interpreting the Second Amendment to
mean what the Heller majority says it means is that the text of the Second
Amendment says nothing about handguns or self-defense. 66 The Court
provides a variety of arguments to explain and justify its interpretation
notwithstanding its apparent dissonance with the text. I am only going to
discuss three of these arguments because I think they raise interesting
questions about how an originalist methodology works. I do not maintain
that the concerns and criticisms I direct at these arguments necessarily
suggest that the Court's conclusion about the Second Amendment
protecting an individual right to bear arms for self-defense purposes is
incorrect. The Court justifies its conclusion with a variety of other
arguments and evidence in addition to the ones I discuss,67 and I do not
discount their persuasiveness. As noted, I remain agnostic on the basic
question of the meaning of the Second Amendment.
A. GRAMMATICALLY-GROUNDED ORIGINALISM
First, there is what I would call the grammatical argument. The
Second Amendment includes two clauses. The first (the prefatory or
justification clause) states, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State"; the second (the operative clause) states, "the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."' 6 The
problem for the Court, of course, is to determine what these clauses
mean and how they fit together.
The Court's answer-and that of several scholars who have studied
the subject-is based in part on rules of grammar. Nelson Lund argues,
for example:
The most significant grammatical feature of the Second Amendment
is that its preamble is an absolute phrase, often called an ablative
absolute or nominative absolute. Such constructions are grammatically
independent of the rest of the sentence, and do not qualify any word in
the operative clause to which they are appended....
Another significant grammatical feature of the Second Amendment
is that the operative clause is a command. Because no word in that
command is grammatically qualified by the prefatory assertion, the
Second Amendment has exactly the same meaning that it would have
had if the preamble had been omitted, or even if the preamble is
demonstrably false.
69
65. Id. at 2818-i9.
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. II.
67. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2790--99, 2805-12 (examining contemporary sources to interpret the right
to keep and bear arms as well as post-ratification case law, legislation, and commentary).
68. U.S. CONsr. amend. II.
69. Nelson Lund, D.C.'s Handgun Ban and the Constitutional Right to Arms: One Hard
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This analysis suggests that the prefatory clause about well-regulated
militias means nothing or next to nothing for interpretative purposes.
The Court's analysis assigns marginally more meaning to the
prefatory clause than Lund does, but not much more. Justice Scalia
explains that the prefatory clause
does not limit [the operative clause] grammatically, but rather
announces a purpose....
Logic demands that there be a link between the stated purpose and
the command.... That requirement of logical connection may cause a
prefatory clause to resolve an ambiguity in the operative
clause .... But apart from that clarifying function, a prefatory clause
does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause."
At least it does not control the meaning of the operative clause if that
clause is expressed in "clear, unambiguous terms."7'
This grammatical analysis raises two questions. The first, obviously,
is whether or not the Court's reasoning about grammar is correct. The
majority opinion cites authorities supporting its position." Justice
Stevens's dissent cites authorities disputing the majority's contentions.73
This discussion led me to think about a different question, however.
What exactly is the role that grammatical rules should play in
interpreting the Constitution pursuant to an original-understanding
Question?, 18 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 229, 236-38 (2008) (footnotes omitted). An amicus brief
for Professors of Linguistics and English directly challenged Lund's analysis. They argued that
Professor Lund's position is at odds with the basic and long accepted linguistic principles we
have discussed [in this brief]. While it is true that absolute phrases are grammatically
independent, it is and has been beyond debate for more than 200 years that absolute
constructions function as adverbial phrases modifying the main clause. In the case of the
Second Amendment, we have shown that the absolute clause affirmatively states the cause
or reason for the Second Amendment's existence. That significantly affects the meaning of
the main clause ....
Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Baron, Ph.D. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at so n.6, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290).
70. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789.
71. Id. at 2789 n.3 (quoting J. SUTHERLAND, STATrrEs AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION 47.04 (5th ed.
1992)). There are numerous other explanations of how the prefatory, purpose, or justification clause
fits with the operative clause of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., David T. Hardy, The Second
Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POE. I, 59 (198 7) (arguing that the
Second Amendment serves two purposes: "The first purpose was to recognize in general terms the
importance of a militia to a free state.... The second purpose was to guarantee an individual right to
own and carry arms."); David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional
Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 617 n. iI6 (2ooo) (suggesting that the inclusion and placement of three
commas in the Second Amendment supports the conclusion that the Amendment was meant "to be
read as a unitary whole" that serves the purpose of "protect[ing] the militia against federal
interference").
72. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789.
73. Id. at 2828-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions,
and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 268 & nn.63-64 (2009) (discussing authorities
marshaled by both Justices Scalia and Stevens to support their grammatical argument).
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analysis? 74 Grammar might be relevant if we were focusing on the
original intent of the drafters of a document. I think this is less likely to
be dispositive when textual language is the product of collaborative
efforts; however, the argument is not implausible. But how much should
grammatical rules control constitutional interpretation that is allegedly
based on the common understanding of the polity? Would it be clear to
citizens that a prefatory clause setting out the purpose of an operative
clause should not be considered in interpreting the meaning of the
operative clause?75
Consider a constitutional provision that states the following:
"Widely available information about government policies and decisions
being critical to the operation of a democracy, the right to a free press
shall not be abridged." Would this purpose for protecting the press be
relevant to the way the general public understood the operative
command of this constitutional requirement? According to the
grammatical logic of Heller, the prefatory clause here about supplying
information related to government policies should not limit or expand
the scope of the operative clause protecting the freedom of the press. I
think there is a fair argument, however, that people reading this
provision would believe that the constitutional protection guaranteed by
this provision extended to reporting and editorials relevant to public
policy, but they might be far less certain that periodicals, or sections of
periodicals (the comics pages, for example), published for entertainment
or recreational purposes were also covered by the provision. Maybe that
is a grammatically incorrect interpretation, but it is not clear to me why
the nuances of grammar should be thought to control the popular
understanding of what language means. If we had clear evidence that
people debating a constitutional provision gave it a grammatically
incorrect interpretation, surely the evidence of what people actually
believed the provision to mean would outweigh what the rules of
74. If originalism is taken seriously, it delegates decisions about constitutional interpretation to
historians who try to determine what people understood the Constitution to mean 220 years ago. This
cedes extraordinary authority over a constitution for 300 million people to a limited academic class.
That is a troubling conclusion for many of us. It is even more troubling to think that critical questions
about fundamental rights and government power are to be determined by those few experts who can
provide an authoritative analysis as to how rules of grammar were understood to operate more than
200 years ago.
75. If the purpose language comes after the operative clause, courts take that language into
account in determining the scope of the right. Thus, in interpreting a state constitutional provision
guaranteeing that "[e]very citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state," the
Supreme Court of Connecticut explained that
[tihe limiting language of the provision may be understood to establish two related
principles. First, it demonstrates that the bearing of arms is not valued in and of itself, but
only as a means to particular ends. Second, it clearly indicates what purposes are not
accorded explicit constitutional protection: the bearing of arms for any purpose other than
the defense of one's self or the state.
Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1231 (Conn. 1995).
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grammar suggested. The more open question is how we should evaluate
grammatical rules of construction that conflict with commonplace
associations that may be inferred from introducing a constitutional
command with a statement of its purpose.
In addition to the Second Amendment, there is one other
constitutional provision that explicitly states a purpose for its operational
command. The Patent and Copyright Clause in Article I Section 8 states
that Congress shall have the power "[tlo promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.76 The
Supreme Court has held that in this context, the purpose of the power (to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts) does control the
meaning assigned to the power and the way that it can be exercised.77
Lund argues that "[u]nlike the Second Amendment, this provision
contains an operative clause that sets out a purpose (to promote the
progress of useful knowledge) and a subordinate phrase that specifies the
means by which that purpose may be pursued (patents and
copyrights)." 8 But I can easily imagine both provisions being understood
in the same way. Both the Second Amendment and the Patent and
Copyright Clause state a purpose and a right or power intended to
implement that purpose. Accordingly, the right or power in both cases
should be understood to further the goal or purpose that explains their
inclusion in the Constitution.
The Heller opinion does suggest that a prefatory clause might be
used to resolve an ambiguity as to the meaning of the operative clause.79
One could certainly argue that there is some ambiguity as to the meaning
and scope of the phrase "freedom of the press," and the prefatory clause
in my example could be used to clarify it. A similar argument might be
applied to the "right to keep and bear arms" language of the Second
Amendment, but the Heller opinion does not take that suggestion
seriously. It does recognize what I would think are inherent ambiguities
in this operative clause. The Court suggests, for example, that the right to
keep and bear arms may be intended to serve multiple purposes.' That
leaves open the possibility that one of those purposes may be more
important than the others and that exercises of the right that implicated
76. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
77. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211-13 (2002) (noting, however, that the Court
generally defers to Congress in determining "how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives");
Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (i99i); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1988); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. i, 5-6 (1966).
78. Lund, supra note 69, at 239.
79. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2oo8).
8o. Id. at 28Ol-02.
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that purpose may deserve more rigorous protection than other exercises
of the right.
The Court also recognizes numerous limitations on the right,
including: the nature of the weapons that fall within its scope, the manner
in which weapons could be carried in public (concealed weapons could
be prohibited), the locations where the right applies, the characteristics
of individuals who may be denied the right, and the conditions and
qualifications under which weapons might be sold in commerce.' Surely,
the range and rigor of these limitations is sufficiently ambiguous that a
prefatory clause might inform a court as to how they should be
understood. But the Court in Heller gives no indication that the prefatory
clause is relevant to resolving any of these questions.
Eugene Volokh has written a thoughtful article arguing that
prefatory language describing the purpose of a right was quite common
in constitutional texts and that it would make little sense to interpret
those provisions to require that the operative clause was never broader
or narrower than the purpose designated in the text."2 But his analysis
does not fully resolve the problem of interpreting the Second
Amendment's language. Volokh does not claim that justification clauses
have no influence on the interpretation of a right. 83 Indeed, he concedes,
as the Court does in Heller, that "[t]o the extent the operative clause is
ambiguous, the justification clause may inform our interpretation of it."8
He goes on to explain, however, that "the justification clause can't take
away what the operative clause provides."8" To avoid being circular,
however, that argument must assume that some core meaning of the
operative clause is sufficiently unambiguous that it can be understood in
its own right without regard to any clarification provided by the
justification clause. If the operative clause is sufficiently ambiguous that
it needs to be clarified by the justification clause, the justification clause
cannot reasonably be criticized as taking away what the operative clause
provides because the justification clause determines what the operative
clause means in the first place.
Identifying such a clear and unambiguous meaning for the right to
keep and bear arms is a hard job. Indeed, it is a hard job for any right if
we take the right seriously. Ultimately, the problem with both Volokh's
and the Court's analyses of the two clauses in the Second Amendment is
that they focus on the meaning of the right in a way that ignores the role
8i. Id. at 2816-17.
82. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 8oi (1998).
83. Yassky, supra note 71, at 617 ("At most... Volokh's work shows that the scope of a
constitutional provision is not necessarily limited by its 'purpose clause'-he provides no excuse for
ignoring the Second Amendment's purpose clause altogether ... .
84. Volokh, supra note 82, at 8o7.
85. Id.
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of doctrine in giving an enumerated right constitutional meaning. As
noted previously, what is involved in interpreting a right is not only an
analysis of the overall scope of the right, but also determining what
infringes the right and what state interests might justify such
infringements. Thus, one may reasonably argue that the language of the
justification clause relating to militias may not "take away" the core idea
that there is an individual right to keep and bear arms. But that does not
mean that the justification clause should not influence what constitutes
an infringement of the right (e.g., whether restrictions imposing
particular kinds of burdens on certain firearms in identified locations
constitute an abridgement of the right) or the level of review applied to
different kinds of firearm regulations.
Consider freedom of speech as an example. The standards of review
applied in free speech cases vary in their rigor based on the courts'
evaluations of various factors including the kind of speech at issue, the
location where the speech occurs, and the nature of the regulation that
limits speech.87 I can easily imagine various prefatory clauses that would
inform courts about the purpose of an operative clause stating that
freedom of speech shall not be abridged. While the prefatory clause need
not be interpreted to mean that the scope of the right is limited to
expression that furthers only that one designated purpose, it might
certainly provide guidance as to the hierarchy of interests the right
protects and the rigor with which certain alleged infringements of the
right should be reviewed. A prefatory clause describing the importance
of open and robust debate to the operation of democratic self-
government, for example, would suggest a different doctrinal hierarchy
than a prefatory clause describing the importance of speaking
authentically and without constraint to the dignity of the individual.
Similarly, one might argue that the right to keep and bear arms for
militia-service purposes constitutes the core of the right and, as such, any
government interference with arms suitable for this purpose should be
carefully scrutinized. The right to keep and bear other arms for other
purposes might also be covered by the right, but as auxiliary purposes.
Accordingly, when the right is exercised to serve those additional
purposes and a law is challenged as interfering with that exercise, a
greater burden on the right might be necessary to determine that an
infringement has occurred and less compelling justifications for
infringing the right might be held to be adequate to sustain the law.
Under this analysis one might argue that a law prohibiting
possession of a handgun in one's home while allowing possession of a
rifle or a shotgun (leaving aside for the moment the additional
86. See supra Part I.
87. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 931-40, 986-I I54.
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requirement of a trigger lock) does not violate the core meaning of the
right to keep and bear arms (or, to use Volokh's language, that such a
law does not employ the justification clause to "take away what the
operative clause provides")." Rifles have greater utility for military
purposes than handguns. They have value for self-defense purposes.
They are more accurate weapons than handguns. Because of the
difficulty of concealing them, they may be far less likely to be used for
criminal purposes. Thus, there are legitimate reasons why a state might
express a regulatory preference for a means of exercising the right that
resonates with the text over another means of exercising the right that
has no direct textual support. The justification clause in the Second
Amendment may not compel a court to uphold such a law. But I would
think that a court would have the discretion to take the justification
clause into account in this way-at least it would if the text of the
Constitution is recognized as a primary source of its meaning.
The Court's analysis recognizes no such discretion. It insists that the
core meaning of the right to keep and bear arms protects the right to
possession and immediate access to handguns for self-defense purposes
and that state interference with such access requires particularly rigorous
justification."' That conclusion not only ignores the purpose set out in the
justification clause in the text (since immediate access to handguns in
one's home has no utility for "militia" services, however that term is
defined),' it also elevates a different purpose, personal defense of one's
home and physical security, which is never mentioned in the text, and
interprets it to control what constitutes an infringement of the right and
the rigor with which such infringements must be reviewed.
B. TEXT AND ORIGINALIsM DISSONANCE
The Court's lack of interest in using the prefatory clause about the
importance of militias to understand the meaning of the operative clause
about the right to keep and bear arms is explained in significant part by
another aspect of its analysis. It is not simply grammar that renders the
militia clause of limited interpretative importance. As the majority
explains in response to Justice Breyer's contention that keeping arms for
self-defense purposes was of secondary importance in the drafting and
88. Volokh, supra note 82, at 8o7.
89. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-I8 & n.27 (2008).
90. The lack of a connection between immediate access to firearms in one's home and militia or
military service can be illustrated by government policies regarding the firearms of police officers. In
Buffalo, New York, for example,
each police officer is instructed that, when at home, all ammunition should be removed
from his service handgun and stored in a location separate from the handgun. Also, officers
are advised to lock the weapon in some manner, and instruction is given on three different
means of locking the weapon to prevent it from firing.
Joseph v. City of Buffalo, 590 N.Y.S.2d 350,351 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
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adoption of the Second Amendment, there is a difference between the
reason that a right is "codified in a written Constitution" and the purpose
furthered by the right itself.9
Thus, the majority suggests that it is largely irrelevant that the text of
the Second Amendment says nothing about self-defense and refers to
some other purpose for enumerating the right to keep and bear arms in
the Constitution. Indeed, according to the Court, it would not matter if in
fact "self-defense had little to do with the right's codification," because
the right at issue preexisted the adoption of the Bill of Rights and it was
understood to be a right to keep and bear arms for self-defense purposes
in its pre-constitutional form.92 Put briefly, the argument seems to be that
the pre-constitutional meaning of a right referenced by language in the
text is more important for interpreting the meaning and scope of the
right than the actual language adopted in the document itself.
This kind of an originalist analysis raises interesting questions that
have implications for the ongoing debate between advocates of
originalist and non-originalist methodologies for interpreting the
Constitution. One of the conventional arguments raised against a non-
originalist methodology for interpreting the Constitution is as powerful
as it is simple: what is the point in adopting a written constitution, it is
argued, if judges can ignore the language of the text and read new non-
enumerated mandates into the constitution?93 That is certainly not a bad
argument, but it is not limited in its application to criticisms of non-
originalist interpretations of the Constitution. It also applies to originalist
arguments that suggest that the Constitution was intended and
understood to mean something that is very different from what it actually
says. As the dissonance between text and alleged original understanding
increases, the value of committing the Constitution's commands to
writing becomes less obvious and less useful.94
91. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801.
92. Id.
93. DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 6-I1
(2005).
94. This general point has been stated clearly by others. Dennis J. Goldford, for example, writes:
The surprising paradox of originalism... is that originalism, due to its assumptions about
language and interpretation, in fact cannot explain the democratically grounded binding
capacity of the Constitution on which it stakes its claim to theoretical and political validity.
The purpose of a Constitution may well be to get everything down on paper, in language, in
order to bind future generations, but originalism's focus on the original understanding-
that is, the writers' intentions or the ratifiers' understanding-in fact presupposes a marked
lack of trust in the capacity of language to bind. We must infer from originalism's focus on
original understanding that, despite its emphasis on the constitutional text, what binds us is
not the language of the text but rather the understanding of the people who wrote and
ratified the language of the text. The paradox here is that if originalism truly believed in the
binding capacity of language that it affirms, it would lose its raison d'etre: Originalism can
claim to be a necessary guide to constitutional interpretation only because it denies the
binding capacity of language that it purports to affirm.
Id. at 52.
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Probably the most obvious example of this kind of dissonance is the
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. The text of the Eleventh
Amendment says nothing about either sovereign immunity or suits by
citizens of a state against their own state government.' Notwithstanding
this absence of even a pretense of textual support for its reasoning, the
Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to protect the sovereign
immunity of states against suits brought by their own citizens alleging
violations of federal statutory and constitutional law. 6 In doing so it has
stated explicitly that "we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to
stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition.., which it
confirms."'
To be fair, the majority in Heller cares more about the language of
the Second Amendment than the Court does about the language of the
Eleventh Amendment. Still, the Court's willingness to subordinate
explicit textual language in the Second Amendment to uncodified
presuppositions about the meaning of the right to bear arms produces
the same kind of a dissonance, although to a more limited degree.
Similarly, the Court's distinction between the reasons for codifying a
right into the Constitution (which it dismisses as largely irrelevant to its
interpretation) and the pre-constitutional purposes of the right (which it
accepts as dispositive for interpretative purposes) suggests that the
language chosen to be in the document is of secondary importance.
The core problem with this kind of an analysis is that it cannot easily
be limited. An unstated predicate to the Court's Eleventh Amendment
and Second Amendment jurisprudence is that the drafters of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights and the citizens who ratified it did not
care that the text of the Constitution did not come close to saying what
they intended it to mean or believed it to mean. Even when there was
obvious language available to communicate an accurate statement of the
scope and purpose of a power or a right, it was perfectly acceptable to
ignore that language and substitute words that suggested something
entirely different in place of a clear statement of what was intended. That
conclusion, however, undermines our commitment to the entire text of
the Constitution. Why should we care about the words chosen to be in
the text of the Constitution today if no one thought that textual language
was particularly relevant or important when the document was adopted?
This concern is amplified by one of the arguments offered by the
majority to support their conclusion that the purpose of protecting the
95. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
96. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 13
(i89o).
97. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Blatchford
v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,779 (199I)).
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right to keep and bear arms was to guarantee "an individual citizen's
right to self-defense." 8 The Heller opinion notes that, prior to the
adoption of the United States Constitution, two states, Pennsylvania and
Vermont, included in their state constitutions language that provided for
a right to keep and bear arms for self-defense purposes-"for the defence
of themselves."'' After the Constitution was ratified, between 1789 and
1820, seven states adopted state constitutional provisions guaranteeing
their citizens the right to bear arms "in defense of themselves and the
state" or guaranteeing each citizen the right to bear arms "in defense of
himself and the State."'" To the majority, these provisions
"unequivocally" expressed protection for an individual's right to self-
defense.'0 '
What the majority fails to consider is a different question raised by
the evidence it cites with approval: if clear and unambiguous language
from state constitutions was available to the drafters of the Second
Amendment to demonstrate that the right to keep and bear arms was
intended to guarantee to citizens the right to use firearms for self-defense
purposes, why does the Second Amendment not use that language to
state this principle "unequivocally"? Further, if the specific language of
the Second Amendment was clearly understood to protect the right to
bear arms for self-defense purposes, why did the drafters of "right to
bear arms" provisions in seven of nine subsequent state constitutions fail
to utilize the Second Amendment's language and, instead, add explicit
references to self-defense purposes?' 2
If we juxtapose the clarity of so many state constitutional provisions
regarding the right to bear arms for self-defense purposes with the
language of the Second Amendment, which does not mention self-
defense but rather emphasizes the importance of state militias, we are
left with an unsettling inference from the Heller analysis. We simply
cannot count on the language in the text of the Constitution to tell us
what its provisions mean and, accordingly, courts are not bound to focus
on textual language in interpreting the document.
C. THE USE OF HANDGUNS FOR THE IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF ONE'S HOME
IN COLONIAL AMERICA
For all of the language in Heller about the popularity and utility of
handguns for self-defense purposes in American history, the Court says
98. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 28o3 (2008).
99. Id. at 2802 (quoting Pa. Declaration of Rights § XIII, in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3082, 3083 (Francis Newton Thorpe
ed., i9o9) (emphasis added)).
oo. Id. at 2793.
o1. Id. at 28o3.
102. Id. at 2793.
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surprisingly little about handgun usage or laws regulating handguns at
the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified and the Bill of Rights
adopted.'" Two questions come to mind. First, were handguns a
commonly accepted weapon of choice for the defense of one's home in
1789? Second, just how useful and available were eighteenth century
handguns for defending one's home against assailants?
As to the first question, I have not researched the issue, but just
skimming a few sources raises several points that merit further inquiry.
The primary and most common weapon used by American soldiers
during the Revolutionary War was the flintlock musket.' 4 Officers,
cavalrymen, and sailors may have had pistols, but infantry men did not. 5
Perhaps more importantly, guns were expensive.'6 Since a pistol would
be of virtually no use for military or hunting purposes, one may wonder
just how common handgun ownership was in 1789. Perhaps more
relevant for an original-understanding analysis of the Second
Amendment, is it significant that the "arms" most people in the country
thought they were being granted the right to keep and bear may have
been muskets that served both militia, hunting, and home protection
purposes? What if the basic understanding of this right emphasized the
possession of weapons capable of serving multiple purposes and the right
to own a handgun was of secondary importance because of its limited
utility?
With regard to the second question, I wonder just how available and
useful a flintlock pistol would be for immediate self-defense. Consider
the process for loading one of these weapons:
[Steps One, Two, & Three:] Shooter pours desired quantity of
relatively coarse-grained propellant powder into muzzle from large
main flask. Then he starts patched ball (patch of thin cloth makes for
tight fit, accurate shot), and rams it down until it is seated atop the
powder firmly but without crushing grains.
[Step Four:] The charge loaded, he returns the ramrod, opens the
flashpan and half-cocks the gun.
[Step Six:] Then he primes with fine powder from his priming flask, not
too much nor too little.
103. Nelson Lund argues that the Heller majority's discussion of a ban on handguns "does not even
purport to be an historical analysis." Lund, supra note 18, at 1355.
104. HAROLD L. PETERSON, ARMS AND ARMOR IN COLONIAL AMERICA 1526-1783, at 159 (2000).
105. WARREN MOORE, WEAPONS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUFTION, at viii (1967) ("During the
Revolutionary War military pistols and infantry swords were rare and somewhat ineffective.");
PETERSON, supra note 104, at 208.
io6. MOORE, supra note lO5, at 59 ("The colonist usually had only one gun which he used for
hunting, protection, and militia duty."); PETERSON, supra note 104, at 179 ("The average colonist could
not afford to own a selection of guns, and so he normally chose one which could serve him well in
hunting and also pass inspection on muster days.").
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[Step Seven:] Lastly he snaps the pan cover shut, tilts the gun to the left
for a second and taps it lightly to ensure that a few grains of priming
have entered the touchhole, and when ready to shoot, cocks to full-
cock.'"
Paper cartridges containing both powder and ball were used during
the Revolutionary War and their use probably made loading a pistol
more efficient.'08 The majority of colonists, however, probably used
powder from a powder horn rather than cartridges at home because "[a]
man could make a powder horn himself without much difficulty, and it
was also more universally useful around the home than the strictly
military cartridge box.""'
I am not sure how the time to load a flintlock pistol compares to the
time it takes to unlock a trigger lock on a modern handgun or rifle, but I
think it is an interesting question to ask and one that deserves an answer.
Perhaps the use of handguns for immediate self-defense could not have
been the purpose of the Second Amendment because the possibility of
such a use did not exist.
Alternatively, Americans may have kept their flintlock pistols
loaded in their homes. But the effectiveness of gunpowder may decline
quickly over time, particularly in damp environments or humid
climates."' At least one expert on flintlocks suggests that colonial
Americans kept loaded guns in their homes, discharged the weapon each
week, and reloaded it to make sure that the powder in the pistol
remained viable for use."' That practice seems more likely to have
occurred in a rural area than an urban one-but again, I claim no
expertise on this subject. I think the Heller opinion may have been more
persuasive, however, if it had examined and discussed whether
Americans during the founding period would have associated handguns
for the immediate defense of the home as a central purpose of the right
to keep and bear arms.
1O7. MOORE, supra note i5, at 5-6 (diagram entitled "How to Load and Fire a Flintlock").
io8. PETERSON, supra note 104, at 232-41.
io9. Id. at 242. Peterson also notes that "officers were apt to use small horns or flasks to load their
personal pistols, particularly those with screw barrels." Id.
iio. E-mail from Toby Bridges, author and expert on muzzle loading firearms, to Sarah Scott,
research assistant to Author (Nov. 8, 2oo8) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal) (noting that
"[m]oisture of any kind is the number one enemy of the black powder" used in colonial times).
iii. Id.
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III. CONSTITUTIONALIZING TORT AND CRIMINAL LAW RELATING
TO THE POSSESSION AND USE OF FIREARMS
A. CONSTITUTIONALIZING CIVIL LIABILITY BASED ON THE POSSESSION AND
STORAGE OF FIREARMS
One of the reasons the government may require firearms kept in
one's home to be unloaded, disassembled, or subject to a trigger lock is
to reduce the risk that inappropriate third parties will gain access to the
weapons and use them to cause serious injury or death to others. Such
constraints make it less likely, for example, that a child will be able to
injure himself or his playmates with a firearm kept in the home. They
also delay, if not fully prevent, an enraged, intoxicated, or mentally
disturbed individual from making immediate use of the firearm. Heller
clearly invalidates direct constraints on firearms, such as trigger locks, to
avoid these risks because they interfere with the utility of the firearm for
immediate self-defense."2
But what about indirect constraints imposed by conventional
negligence law? Does the Second Amendment also prohibit holding a
gun owner liable if one of these risks is actualized and the victim of a
shooting files a negligence claim against him or her?"3 Let us suppose a
child living with or invited to the home of the gun owner gains access to a
handgun and shoots and kills a playmate. The decedent child's parents
bring a negligence action against the owner, arguing that the handgun
should have been placed in a locked location inaccessible to children.
The defendant owner answers that the constraints required to prevent
children from gaining access to the handgun, such as disassembling it or
storing it in a locked gun cabinet, would render the weapon less available
for immediate self-defense.
Under conventional negligence rules, the plaintiff ought to have a
strong claim in this kind of a case."4 Leaving dangerous objects in places
where children can gain access to them may certainly be viewed as
unreasonable conduct. The probability and magnitude of harm resulting
from the risk that a child may obtain access to the firearm and cause
serious injuries to himself or others may outweigh the probability and
magnitude of harm resulting from the risk that the firearm will not be
immediately available for use if the owner is attacked and needs the
112. See District of Columbia v. Heler, 128 S. Ct. 2783. 2817-22 (20o8).
113. Some proponents of a vigorously enforced Second Amendment support the use of tort
liability to control the behavior of gun owners "who are prone to carelessness or fits of temper that
result in unplanned injuries to innocent persons." Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political
Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 127 (1987).
114. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 cmt. b (1965) ("[lI]t is negligent to place
loaded firearms... within reach of young children or feeble-minded adults."); see also sources cited
infra notes 128-3o and accompanying text.
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handgun to defend himself. The open question after Heller is whether the
Second Amendment has to be taken into account in adjudicating these
negligence lawsuits by adding constitutional weight to the gun owner's
interest and limiting the jury's discretion to find the owner liable.
It is easy to imagine how the Second Amendment could be
employed to influence the results in a case like this. The defendant might
argue that it is unconstitutional to require him to store or disable the
handgun in a way that limits its effectiveness for self-defense purposes.
Plaintiff might reply that even if this is so, it does not relieve the
defendant of the responsibility of watching over and protecting children
who are visiting his home. Plaintiff might argue that the defendant
should have locked the guns up while children were in the house or
supervised the children to make sure that they did not gain access to the
firearms.
Defendant could respond, however, that as every parent knows, it is
impossible to monitor the activities of children every minute that they
are in one's home. Reasonably prudent persons do not do that.
Moreover, locking up the handgun while children are in the house would
deny him the right to keep and bear arms for immediate self-defense
during the period the children were in his home. Defendant may have
children of his own who spend a good part of the day and all of the night
at home. His children may often have friends over in the afternoon and
sometimes for sleepovers. The burden of locking up his firearms
whenever children were in the vicinity, and unlocking them when
children were absent, would be substantial. Liability rules like this chill
gun ownership so severely that, in effect, they require the gun owner to
lock up his weapons all the time-the very result that Heller declares to
be unconstitutional.
These are not hypothetical cases and arguments. Consider the events
and legal arguments discussed in Kuhns v. Brugger, a Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision dealing with exactly this issue."' Defendant, an
elderly man, lived at least part of each year in an isolated cottage on the
shores of Lake Erie."6 Because of thefts and burglaries that had occurred
to neighboring properties, he kept a loaded .22 caliber automatic pistol in
an unlocked dresser drawer in his bedroom."7 Defendant's twelve-year-
old grandsons were frequent visitors to his cottage."' They had the run of
the house and were not prohibited from visiting the bedroom, and they
knew where the pistol was stored."9 One day while the defendant was
I15. 135 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1957).
xI6. Id. at 399.
117. Id. at 410 (Bell, J., dissenting).
x18. Id. at 403 (majority opinion).
I 9. Id.
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away, one grandson went to the dresser, picked up the pistol, and
accidentally fired it at the other child.' The victim of the shooting was
severely injured.2 ' He sued his grandfather for damages based on the
defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care with regard to his
possession and storage of the firearm.'"
Counsel for the defendant argued that the defendant "had a perfect
right to keep this pistol in his home if only to protect himself against
nocturnal prowlers.' ' .3  Counsel asked, "Where else should [the
defendant] . . . have kept a gun for protection against unexpected
midnight intrusion, except in the dresser drawer of his private bedroom
where it would be readily available in case of need?"'2 4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not persuaded. It explained
that while it might have been reasonable for the defendant to keep the
loaded pistol at his bedside "for immediate use at night," reasonable care
required that it be kept "under lock and key" during daylight hours when
young children were known to be frequent visitors -particularly when
the defendant might not be present.' 5
One justice dissented from the majority's analysis. He argued that it
was not negligent for an elderly man to keep "in his top bureau drawer a
loaded pistol in order to protect himself from burglars, robbers and
prowlers...... The majority decision would require parents and
grandparents who owned firearms to keep them "under lock and key" in
order to avoid exposure to lawsuits. That result was unacceptable
because it unreasonably burdened an individual's ability to protect
himself and his family:
If, for example, a burglar or robber entered a man's home at night and
he awoke, he would have to try to recall where he had hidden the key,
get up in the dark, find it, unlock the drawer and finally get out the
pistol, in order to defend himself or his property.'"
The case law in this area is mixed depending on the facts and the
jurisdiction. ' Courts take several factors into account, including the
i2o. Id. at 399-400.
121. Id. at 4oo.
122. Id. at 398, 403.
123. Id. at 404.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 410 (Bell, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Hall v. McBryde, 919 P.2d 9io, 911, 913 (Colo. App. 1996) (affirming finding that
father was not negligent when his son found firearm, that father attempted to conceal, and fired it
injuring neighbor); Cathey v. Bernard, 467 So. 2d 9, lo-si (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that foster
parents were negligent in storing pistol, that was kept loaded for protection on high shelf in closet,
where child obtained access to it by climbing over bed and onto dresser to reach it and accidentally
discharged firearm which resulted in death of another child); Valence v. State, 280 So. 2d 651, 653, 655
(La. Ct. App. 1973) (finding that state police officer was negligent in leaving loaded pistol in glove
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extent to which the gun owner took precautions to limit children's access
to the firearm.'29 In many cases, the issue is left to the jury.'3°At least one
decision, however, noted the constitutional implications raised by these
cases. In Lopez v. Chewiwie, defendants kept a high-powered rifle in
their residence.'3' When they left their thirteen-year-old son home alone,
he gained access to the firearm and killed the plaintiff's son with it.'32
Plaintiff brought suit and claimed the parents were negligent in leaving a
firearm in their home without taking any precautions to prevent their
minor son from obtaining and discharging it.'33 The New Mexico
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claim.'34 In doing so, it
noted that loaded firearms are kept in many homes in the state.'35 More
pointedly, A cited the state constitutional provision guaranteeing the
people "the right to bear arms for their security and defense."'' 6
Typically, tort suits based on a defendant's alleged negligence do not
raise federal constitutional issues. But Heller may change that
conventional state of affairs for some tort suits involving the accidental
discharge of firearms. It may be necessary for state courts to look for
constitutional guidance as to how these negligence lawsuits should be
compartment of his family car "in order to have ready access to the weapon," which allowed a child to
obtain access to the firearm and shoot a playmate); People v. Jackson, No. 241597, 2003 WL 23018259,
at *I-*2, *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2003) (upholding manslaughter conviction of defendant, a
former felon, who kept loaded gun for protection between mattresses where eight-year-old child
gained access to it and fired it, resulting in his death); Thomas v. Inman, 578 P.2d 399, 40, 405 (Or.
1978) (finding father, who kept shotgun at home for protection against burglars and hid it under his
bed to avoid children learning of its location, not negligent when eleven-year-old son accidentally
killed ten-year-old cousin with the firearm); Prather v. Brandt, 981 S.W.2d 8o1, 804, 807 (Tex. App.
1998) (finding that father was not negligent when responsible teenage son left shotgun in family truck
where son's friend gained access to it and used it in drive-by shooting).
I29. See, e.g., Hall, 919 P.2d at 913 (noting that defendant attempted to conceal existence of
firearm from child and hid firearm in location seldom visited by child); Thomas, 578 P.2d at 404
(focusing on fact that father "attempted to conceal shotgun from his children" and forbid them to
enter the room where firearm was stored).
130. See, e.g., Glean v. Smith, 156 S.E.2d 507, 509 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that jury should
decide whether defendant was negligent in storing loaded gun in top drawer of child-size bureau
where child obtained access to it and discharged weapon inuring another child); Thomas, 578 P.2d at
401, 405 (upholding jury's verdict that father who kept a shotgun under his bed to protect his home
against intruders was not negligent when his eleven-year-old son accidentally fired the weapon and
killed a playmate); Stanley v. Joslin, 757 S.W.2d 328, 329-30, 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing
grant of summary judgment so that jury could decide whether grandmother and half brother of
fourteen-year-old boy were negligent in storing firearms and ammunition in unlocked gun rack in their
home when the youth accidentally shot a friend with one of the guns).
131. I86 P.2d 512, 512 (N.M. 1947).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 514.
135. Id. at 513
136. Id. (quoting N.M. CONsr. art. II, § 6).
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resolved in order to avoid the substantial burdening of a gun owner's
Second Amendment rights.'37
B. CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE PRIVILEGE AND EXCUSE OF SELF-DEFENSE
i. The Elements of Self-Defense that Are Susceptible to
Constitutional Scrutiny
An even more interesting question is whether Heller requires the
constitutionalization of self-defense decisions in tort and criminal law.
The Heller opinion declares that the Second Amendment protects the
individual right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of immediate self-
defense. I,8 That raises the question of whether the Second Amendment
extends its coverage to the right to use arms, such as handguns, for self-
defense purposes. Surely, it would make no sense to hold that Americans
have the right to possess handguns in their homes for self-defense
purposes, but that they could be subject to severe criminal and civil
penalties if they ever employed those firearms in defense of their persons
or property.'39 It would seem that the Second Amendment must protect
some use of firearms in self-defense to avoid being an empty and
meaningless right of no use to those who exercise it. 40 But just how much
of a right to use firearms for self-defense purposes is protected by this
constitutional provision? 4 '
The Second Amendment is something of an anomaly here. In
protecting the right to speak, for example, the First Amendment requires
the review of regulations that limit the use of the instruments that people
employ to express their messages. Restrictions on loud speakers, signs,
137. The influence of the right to keep and bear arms on tort law has been suggested in other
circumstances as well. Both state and federal constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to keep
and bear arms have been cited by courts in dismissing product liability actions brought against gun
manufacturers asserting that handguns are by their nature unreasonably dangerous products. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 12oo, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984); Rhodes v. R.G. Indus.,
Inc., 325 S.E.2d 465, 466-67 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). See generally Stephen P. Halbrook, Tort Liability for
the Manufacture, Sale, and Ownership of Handguns?, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 351 (1983).
138. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821-22 (2008).
139. See Town of Canton v. Madden, 96 S.W. 699, 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1906) ("[I]f the citizen has
reserved to himself the right to bear arms in defense of his home, person or property, he also has
reserved the right to effectuate that privilege by employing such arms under the established limitations
of the law.... for the right to bear arms in defense of one's property, his home or his person, would
amount to naught if the right to use such arms, under proper circumstances, were denied.").
140. See Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment
for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 182o-21 (2oo7) (suggesting that if the Supreme Court "concludes
that the Second Amendment secures an individual right... then some right to self-defense might be
inherently protected through the Second Amendment," but recognizing that the right could be based
on other constitutional sources); cf. NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 859-6o (7th Cir. 2oo9).
141. The First Amendment has been held to constitutionalize defamation law. See N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1964). The open question is whether a parallel argument supports the
Second Amendment constitutionalizing the affirmative defense or privilege of self-defense.
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and leaflets are subject to constitutional challenge if they impede
people's ability to communicate."
The Court's Second Amendment analysis reverses that relationship.
Heller focuses constitutional protection on the possession of the
instruments (firearms) that people may need to defend themselves and
their homes.'43 Notwithstanding that reversal of means and ends, it is
hard to understand how the Court could provide constitutional
protection to the means to exercise self-defense without extending some
protection to the act of self-defense itself. If that turns out to be the case,
the scope of Heller may extend far beyond the review of allegedly
excessive gun control laws.
There are hundreds of state and federal tort and criminal law cases
in which defendants seek to avoid civil or criminal liability by asserting
the privilege or justification of self-defense.'" Federal cases rarely
suggest that this affirmative defense is grounded in a constitutional
foundation,'45 and a few cases explicitly reject the idea.' In the few cases
where a constitutional foundation for the defense is mentioned, it is
virtually never invoked to require the invalidation of a statute or to
reverse a lower court or jury's decision as to the applicability of the
defense. 47
Many state cases, however, recognize that there is a natural or
constitutional right to defend oneself against attack and to keep and bear
arms for self-defense purposes.'4 There is also general agreement that
142. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (signs); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (loudspeakers); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (i939) (leaflets).
143. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821-22.
144. See generally John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Standard for Determination of Reasonableness
of Criminal Defendant's Belief, for Purposes of Self-defense Claim, that Physical Force is Necessary, 73
A.L.R. 4th 993 (1989) (surveying state and federal self-defense cases).
145. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Self-Defense?, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 187, 203-06 (2006) (describing
Supreme Court cases that uphold the right to self-defense but do not acknowledge a constitutional
foundation for the right).
146. See, e.g., Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3 d 1047, 1052 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that there is no
fundamental constitutional right to self-defense in the Due Process Clause); Fields v. Harris, 675 F.2d
219, 220 (8th Cir. 1982) (rejecting argument that the Second, Fifth, or Eighth Amendments create a
substantive constitutional right to self-defense).
147. Rare opinions suggest that the right to self-defense is constitutionally grounded. See, e.g.,
Griffin v. Martin, 785 F.2d 1172, II86 n.37 (4th Cir. 1986) ("It is difficult to the point of impossibility to
imagine a right in any state to abolish self defense altogether...."); Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129,
1140 (6th Cir. 198o) (Merritt, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the Constitution prohibits a state from
eliminating the justification of self-defense from its criminal law...."). This is really the exception
rather than the rule, however. See Volokh, supra note i4o, at I818 ("Lethal self-defense is so broadly
accepted that courts have rarely encountered grave restrictions on it, and thus haven't squarely
decided whether the federal Constitution protects it.").
148. See, e.g., Trinen v. City & County of Denver, 53 P.3d 754, 76o-6I (Colo. App. 2002) (Roy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that state constitution recognizes, and does not
create, a "natural and inalienable right" to defend and protect life, liberty, and property); People v.
Bums, 133 N.E. 263, 265 (I11. 1921) (explaining that the law recognizes and protects a natural right to
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the scope and applicability of the right is subject to regulation by the
legislature at least to some extent.'49 Some courts emphasize that the
regulation cannot abrogate the right entirely or undermine its essential
meaning.' Others take a more expansive view of the state's police power
prerogatives in identifying the circumstances in which the right may be
asserted.'5 ' More state courts than federal courts have actually based
self-defense); Thorton v. Taylor, 39 S.W. 830, 831 (Ky. 1897) (recognizing that self-defense is natural
right and codified in law); Stanley v. Commonwealth, 6 S.W. 155, 156 (Ky. 1887) (explaining that self-
defense is a natural, and not a social, right); Town of Canton v. Madden, 96 S.W. 699, 700 (Mo. Ct.
App. 19o6) (reasoning that self-defense is a natural right under organic law, reflected in spirit and
word of state constitution); State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 223 (N.C. 1921) (explaining that the state
constitution protects the sacred right to keep and bear arms "based upon the experience of the ages");
State v. Hirsch, 114 P.3d 1104, 11o6-07 (Or. 2005) (stating that state constitutional right is grounded
upon English and Colonial American understanding of right to bear arms); State v. Foutch, 34 S.W. 1,
2 (Tenn. 1896) (stating that state constitutional right confers right to defend one's self, home, and
family); Andrews v. State, 5o Tenn. (3 Heisk.) i65, 177-8o (Tenn. 187) (construing state
constitutional right to extend to individuals for self-defense and defense of state). See generally
Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights of Self-Defense and Defense of Property, ii TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 399 (2007) (describing cases in which courts apply state constitutional provisions guaranteeing the
right to self-defense).
149. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1233 (Conn. 1995) (listing numerous state
decisions supporting its conclusion that "[sitate courts that have addressed the question under their
respective constitutions overwhelmingly have recognized that the right [to keep and bear arms] is not
infringed by reasonable regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power to protect the health,
safety and morals of the citizenry" (footnote omitted)); State v. Comeau, 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Neb.
1989) ("Our research has revealed that courts throughout the country have ... uniformly upheld the
police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state
constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.").
15o. See, e.g., Trinen, 53 P.3 d at 757 (upholding statute prohibiting carrying of concealed weapons
because while legislation may not "render[] constitutional provisions nugatory," the right to bear arms
is not absolute and may be subject to reasonable regulations); Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d
170, 181 (Ky. 2oo6) (upholding prohibition against felons possessing firearms as reasonable against
constitutional challenge, while insisting that regulations may not "unduly infringe upon the general
exercise of [the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense] as it was envisioned and preserved" in
state constitution); Comeau, 448 N.W.2d at 598 (upholding reasonable regulations limiting possession
of firearms, but insisting "that the legitimate governmental purpose in regulating the right to bear
arms cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle the exercise of this right where the governmental
purpose can be more narrowly achieved"); Ohio v. Martin, No. 48o67, 1984 WL 3623, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 21, 1984) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]f the State were to
attempt to make an act of self-defense a crime, it would violate... the Ohio Constitution as well as the
Second, Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."); Andrews, 50
Tenn. (3 Heisk.) at 177-8o (suggesting that state constitutional right to keep arms may be regulated for
public good, as long as the restriction does not infringe upon "necessary incidents" to exercise right).
See generally State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 37-39 (Ark. 1842) (Lacy, J., dissenting) (arguing that no law
punishing exercise of self-defense could ever be upheld); Kerner, io7 S.E. at 225 (explaining that a law
prohibiting the possession of a pistol of very short length might be reasonable and constitutional, but
"[t]o exclude all pistols, however, is not a regulation, but a prohibition, of arms.., which the people
are entitled to bear").
I5I. See, e.g., Isaiah v. State, 58 So. 53, 55 (Ala. 1911) (McClellan, J., concurring) (stating that the
right may be reasonably regulated in exercise of police power and does not confer absolute right to
bear arms "upon all occasions and in all places"); Dano v. Collins, 802 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 199o) (subjecting ban on firearms in public parks to rational-basis review and upholding
restriction as reasonable regulation); People v. Camperlingo, 231 P. 6ol, 6o4 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924)
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their decisions to invalidate a statute as applied, or reverse a judicial
decision, on the constitutional right to possess a firearm for self-
defense.'52 Thus the United States Supreme Court would be breaking
relatively new ground if it decided to constitutionalize the right of self-
defense under the Second Amendment.
Should the Court proceed in this direction, it might begin by
identifying the elements or criteria, in criminal law and tort law, that
courts employ in determining the validity of a claim of self-defense. For
each element, it could ask whether the state may exercise discretion in
requiring and defining that element or whether it is bound by
constitutional parameters when it decides what constitutes self-defense.
Since discharging a firearm at a person typically constitutes the use of
deadly force, the rules relating to the use of deadly force should be the
focus of this inquiry.
(upholding statute prohibiting felon from possessing a firearm against challenge that it abridges right
to bear arms because "[i]t is clear that, in the exercise of the police power of the state ... such rights
may be either regulated or, in proper cases, entirely destroyed"); State v. Keet, 190 S.W. 573, 575 (Mo.
1916) (stating that the legislature may regulate right in interest of public safety and morals); Heidbrink
v. Swope, 170 S.W.3d 13, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that state constitutional right to keep and
bear arms can be regulated through time, place, and manner restrictions); State v. Dees, 669 P.2d 261,
263-64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that state constitutional right to bear arms is not unfettered and
conditioned upon circumstances in which the government seeks to regulate it to prevent crime); State
v. Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d 481, 483 (N.D. 1987) (rejecting argument that state constitutional right to bear
arms is absolute and upholding reasonable regulations under police power); State v. Johnson, 56 S.E.
544, 545 (S.C. 19o7) (upholding statute prohibiting firing of firearms within city limits as reasonable
exercise of police power).
152. See, e.g., People v. King, 582 P.2d iooo, 1oo7 (Cal. 1978) (en banc) (holding that the statutory
right to self-defense allows felons to possess concealed firearms in an emergency); City of Lakewood
v. Pillow, 501 P.2d 744, 745 (Colo. 1972) (holding that ordinance prohibiting the possession of firearms
outside of the home is unconstitutional in part because it prohibits citizens from possessing firearm for
self-defense in car or place of business); Rabbitt v. Leonard, 43 A.2d 489,491 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979)
(holding that under state constitutional provision protecting citizen's right to bear arms for self-
defense purposes, revocation of pistol permit deprives owner of liberty interest and must comply with
procedural due process requirements); Smiley v. State, 966 So. 2d 330,334-35 (Fla. 2007) (holding that
the statutory right to self-defense abolishes common law duty to retreat); State v. Rathbone, ioo P.2d
86, 91 (Mont. 194o) (reversing conviction for killing elk out of season based on right to defend one's
self and property); State v. Hardy, 397 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (holding that state
constitutional guarantee of right to self-defense requires construing statute prohibiting felons from
having firearms to permit such individuals to use a firearm in self-defense); State v. Rosenthal, 55 A.
61o, 611 (Vt. i9o3) (invalidating part of ordinance that prohibited person from carrying pistol without
permission of mayor or chief of police because it was "repugnant to the Constitution and the laws of
the state"); State ex rel. Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 144 (W. Va. 1988) (finding proscription
against carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon overbroad and in violation of state constitution). The
overwhelming majority of decisions relating to the use of a firearm for self-defense purposes do not
strike down laws or reverse lower court decisions on this basis. See, e.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, The
Right to Bear Arms in Texas: The Intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights, 4 BAYLOR L. REv. 629, 676
(1989) (noting that although there is a right to keep and bear arms in the state constitution, "the
constitutional right to bear arms is perhaps the only Texas Bill of Rights provision that has never been
relied on in any published opinion to invalidate a statute or to acquit a defendant").
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The defendant asserting self-defense in a criminal case must
establish the following: (i) he reasonably believes he is in danger of
unlawful bodily harm from his adversary, (2) the attack he fears must be
imminent, (3) the attack must threaten death or serious bodily harm, (4)
he must reasonably believe that it is necessary to use force to avoid this
danger, and (5) the amount of force used must be reasonable in the
circumstances. 
53
There are a variety of auxiliary rules. Some jurisdictions require an
individual to retreat before using deadly force, although the majority rule
does not require doing so." Those jurisdictions requiring retreat do not
apply this rule if a person is threatened in his home or place of
business.'55 Aggressors who initiated the confrontation are limited in
their ability to assert the defense., 6 Special circumstances, such as those
involving the use of deadly force by battered women, will be taken into
account in determining the validity of the defense.'57 An action taken in
self-defense that causes injuries to an innocent third party is protected
unless it is reckless.""
Tort law requirements for successfully asserting the privilege of self-
defense are similar to criminal law standards. The central issue in
evaluating the defense is whether or not the defendant acted reasonably
in the circumstances in protecting himself from harm.5 9 This requires a
determination of the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that he is
threatened by imminent harm and the reasonableness of his response.1
153. For a general summary of the elements of self-defense, see, for example, United States v.
Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973); State v. Jenewicz, 940 A.2d 269, 274-75 (N.J. 2008);
and WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., SURSTATVIvE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4(a) (2d ed. 1986).
154. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 153, §io.4 (f).
155. Id. The Model Penal Code provides that "[tihe use of deadly force is not
justifiable... if... the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete
safety by retreating." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3 .04(2)(b)(ii) (1962). The explanatory note makes clear,
however, that "an actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work." Id. explanatory
note.
156. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 153, §10.4(e).
157. Id. §10.4(d).
158. Id. § 10.4(g); see also State v. Rodriguez, 949 A.2d 197, 202 (N.J. 2008). But see
Commonwealth v. Fowlin, 71o A.2d 1130, 1132-35 (Pa. 1998) (holding that a defendant determined to
have acted in self-defense cannot be held to have acted recklessly in injuring third party).
159. Minowitz v. Failing, 123 P.2d 417, 419 (Colo. 1942) (stating that a defendant may use "no
more force than is reasonably necessary for protection"); Coleman v. Strohman, 821 P.2d 88, 89 (Wyo.
i99i) (evaluating self-defense claim and holding that "[t]he jury is ... required to apply an objective
standard in deciding whether an individual's belief that it was necessary to defend himself was
reasonable"); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 126 (5th ed. 1984).
i6o. The defendant's "response must be reasonable not only in being grounded in a reasonable
perception of imminent harm, but also in consisting of an appropriate or proportional response to the
perceived threat." JOHN C. GOLDBERG Er AL., TORT LAW RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 6oI (2d ed.
2008); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63(1) (1965) ("An actor is privileged to use
reasonable force.., to defend himself against unprivileged harmful or offensive contact or other
bodily harm which he reasonably believes that another is about to inflict intentionally upon him.").
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When deadly force is used in self-defense, the defendant is privileged
when he reasonably believes he is threatened by "death or serious bodily
harm or ravishment, which can safely be prevented only by the
immediate use of such force.",,
6
'
Tort law auxiliary rules parallel those of criminal law as well. A
minority rule requires the actor to retreat if he can safely do so, but this
requirement does not apply if a person is attacked in his home. 6, If an
innocent third party is injured by a person acting in self-defense, the
defendant will be liable if he acted negligently in the circumstances.163
If the Court is going to take seriously the right to use arms for self-
defense purposes, it will have to determine just how much discretion
legislatures, common law courts, and juries will be permitted in defining
and applying this affirmative defense.' 64 That may require constitutional
scrutiny of some of these auxiliary rules. For example, is the rule adopted
by the majority of jurisdictions that there is no duty to retreat, and
certainly no duty to retreat from one's own home, constitutionally
mandated? Consider a hard case where both the defendant and the
person injured in the act of self-defense live in the same house. Suppose
a husband and wife argue bitterly in the house they share. The husband
slaps the wife. She runs upstairs to obtain a handgun she keeps in a
bedside bureau, yelling that she will kill her husband if he is still in the
house when she comes back down. He can safely flee the house and drive
away. If he waits until his wife returns to the living room, a pistol in her
hand, is he justified in using deadly force to protect himself against
her?6 ' Does the auxiliary rule providing that there is no duty to retreat in
i61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65(0)(b). As the Restatement explains,
Since the means used must be proportionate to the danger threatened, it is obvious that
one is not privileged to protect one's self even from a blow which is likely to cause some
fairly substantial injury by means which are intended or likely to cause death or serious
bodily harm.
Id. § 63 cmt. j.
162. DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 78-79 (2OO1); PROSSER, supra
note 159, at 127-28;.
163. KEETON ET AL., supra note 159, at 128-29.
164. Of course, some courts define self-defense so expansively that it is unlikely that their holdings
could ever be subject to constitutional challenge. In State v. Kerner, for example, the defendant was
attacked while carrying some packages on a public street. 1O7 S.E. 222, 223 (N.C. 1921 ) . He set down
his packages, went to his place of business to pick up the pistol he kept there, and returned to the
street with the gun in plain view, looking for his assailants. Id. The court concluded: "On this occasion,
the defendant threatened with violence was forced to abandon his property. He went to his place of
business where he had the right to keep his pistol ... and returned with it unconcealed. He was acting
in self-defense of his person and in defense of his property." Id. at 225; see also Bray v. Isbell, 458 So.
2d 594, 595-97 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding trial court's conclusion that defendant acted in self-
defense when he shot at fleeing individuals seventy-five feet away who had broken into a vending
machine in his motel).
165. For another hard case, consider the facts of Semaire v. State, 612 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Crim. App.
I98O). A husband and wife had been separated several times during a troubled marriage. Id. at 530.
The fact that each possessed property belonging to the other was apparently a point of contention. Id.
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one's own home apply in this case? If a court holds that it does not,
should that decision be subject to constitutional review?
The key questions for constitutional purposes, however, focus on the
core meaning of the defense as well as these auxiliary rules. Is it
permissible for a state to limit the exercise of the right of self-defense to
only those situations in which the defendant acts reasonably? If a
reasonableness standard is constitutionally appropriate, does
constitutional law impose constraints on the state's determination as to
what constitutes reasonable conduct in the circumstances by a defendant
who asserts the right of self-defense? Finally, should an appellate court
make "an independent examination of the whole record" in reviewing
the trial court's conclusion that a defendant acted unreasonably and
therefore cannot justify his conduct as self-defense, or should appellate
review be limited to correcting errors of law and deciding whether
findings of fact are clearly unsupported by the evidence?
2. The Constitutionality of Evaluating Self-Defense Under a
Reasonableness Standard
In considering these questions, it may be helpful to refer back to
Justice Scalia's contention in Heller that the exercise of the right to keep
and bear arms cannot be subject to review under an "interest-balancing"
approach.' 6, Would that concern about the impropriety of "interest-
balancing" apply as well to a citizen's right to use a firearm "in defense of
hearth and home"?
The question is an important one because a reasonableness analysis
intrinsically involves ad hoc interest-balancing to at least some extent.
Evaluating the reasonableness of a defendant's belief that he is
threatened and the reasonableness of his response requires some kind of
a cost-benefit analysis. Courts and juries must determine the probability
The husband brought his wife's jacket over to the apartment where his wife was staying to exchange it
for some of his property. Id. at 531. When he knocked on the door, she refused to open it and told him
if he did not leave quickly, she would shoot him through the door. Id. The husband broke the door
open and entered the apartment. Id. He saw his wife raise her hands and, thinking she was going to
start shooting at him, he pulled out his own revolver and shot and killed her. Id. Can the husband
claim self-defense under these circumstances? Should the case go to the jury with an instruction
regarding self-defense? If the wife was justified in using deadly force in response to her husband's
conduct, his claim that he was attempting to protect himself against her use of such force would not
constitute self-defense, even if his testimony was credible. But did his busting through the door
constitute a sufficient threat to justify his wife responding with deadly force? Even if the wife was not
justified in using deadly force, was the husband justified in shooting her when he might have been able
to safely retreat by immediately leaving the apartment? The court held, notwithstanding several
dissents, that the issue of the husband's acting in self-defense should be submitted to the jury. Id. at
529, 531-32. If the dissenting justices had prevailed and the husband's self-defense claim had been
rejected as a matter of law, would the husband be able to challenge his conviction on federal
constitutional grounds?
166. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,499 (984).
167. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008).
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that the alleged assailant will attempt to cause harm to the defendant.
They must decide what the magnitude of that harm is likely to be.
Finally, they must consider whether the defendant's response was
commensurate to that threat or whether it involved excessive force or an
unreasonable risk of injury to third parties.
Justice Scalia states in Heller that "[t]he very enumeration of the
right takes out of the hands of government-even the Third Branch of
Government-the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the
right is really worth insisting upon." '69 Clearly, he is suggesting that
statutes that abridge the right to keep and bear arms cannot be reviewed
under a reasonableness standard. But surely Scalia would also contend
that it is unconstitutional for the political branches of government, or the
courts, to decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not it was
reasonable, and therefore lawful, for an individual to keep and bear a
handgun in his home. 7' If the District of Columbia amended its law to
permit residents to keep and bear arms in their homes for self-defense
purposes only when it is reasonable for them to do so, I think that
ordinance would be struck down as unconstitutional under the reasoning
and authority of Heller.'7 ' Accordingly, we can ask: if there is a
constitutional right to use a firearm in self-defense, is it unconstitutional
for the political branches of government, or the judicial branch, to decide
on a case-by-case basis whether or not it is reasonable, and therefore
lawful, for an individual to discharge a firearm to defend himself and his
home?
As noted above, an analysis of the reasonableness of the defendant's
belief and conduct is intrinsic to evaluating a self-defense claim in both
tort and criminal law.'72 In the words of one state court opinion in a
criminal case, the "key to the defense of self-defense is
reasonableness."'73 Similarly, in tort law, "the self-defense analysis
I68. As the Supreme Court of New Hampshire explained in evaluating a claim of self-defense,
It is reasonable that the kind and amount of defensive force should be measurably
proportioned to the kind and amount of danger, to the apparent consequences of using the
force, and the apparent consequences of not using it. The probable consequences on both
sides are to be considered and compared.
Aldrich v. Wright 53 N.H. 398,405 (1873).
169. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
170. Other courts have also suggested that "by requiring that restrictions on the right be only
reasonable, rather than necessary," a court implicitly concludes that the right to keep and bear arms is
not a fundamental right. Trinen v. City & County of Denver, 53 P.3 d 754,757 (Colo. App. 2002).
171. At least one court has reversed this analysis. The Supreme Court of Connecticut argued that
because the "common law principle permitting one to use deadly force in self-defense has long been
restricted by the general rule of reason," the constitutional right to bear arms for self-defense purposes
must be similarly limited by a rule of reason. Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1232 (Conn. 1995).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Daija, 529 F. Supp. 2d 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
173. Bechtel v. State, 84o P.2d i, io (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); see also Sacrini v. United States, 38
App. D.C. 371, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1912) (explaining that with regard to self-defense, "[tihe true test for the
application of the jury is whether the circumstances presented to the mind of the defendant were such
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incorporates negligence principles... [because] a party who overreacts
to a perceived threat may be held liable in negligence if his actions are
unreasonable in light of the circumstances."'74
On its face, one might argue that a reasonableness standard is
intrinsically inconsistent with the idea that the right to use firearms for
self-defense purposes is a fundamental, constitutionally protected right.
A reasonableness standard is intrinsically ad hoc and unpredictable
in its application. Its use to evaluate the legality of an individual's
conduct creates a daunting chilling effect that can easily discourage the
exercise of a right. It also provides law enforcement agents, courts, and
juries far too much discretion in deciding whether or not to subject the
exercise of the right to sanction. Clearly, a law that only permitted
reasonable speech in a public or nonpublic forum, or anywhere else,
would be struck down summarily. Yet this is exactly the kind of a law
that is routinely applied to the right to use a firearm for self-defense
purposes.
Justice Scalia might reply that historically the right of self-defense
has been understood under the common law to be limited to reasonable
beliefs and conduct. But that response raises more questions than it
answers. Common law decisions, and society's determination of what
constitutes reasonable behavior, change over time. The common law
system recognizes and anticipates doctrinal development and revision,
and, of course, common law decisions may be modified and overridden
by statutes. If the right to self-defense expands and contracts according
to common law decisions in a jurisdiction, if its substance depends on the
changing attitudes of the community with regard to what people consider
to be reasonable, and if it can be substantially narrowed by legislation,
then there seems little basis for characterizing this defense as a
constitutional right.
Alternatively, one might argue that the right to self-defense is
defined by the common law standards that were prevalent and accepted
200 years ago. At a minimum, judges and juries must interpret the right
to provide at least as much protection as it did at the end of the
eighteenth century. That approach, however, incorporates a particular
understanding of what it means to act reasonably into constitutional
doctrine. It would seem to require that every rejection of a claim of self-
defense could be challenged on the constitutional ground that the court's
that they would have produced upon the mind of any reasonably prudent person, situated as the
defendant was at the time, the reasonable belief that the deceased was then about to kill him or to do
him serious bodily harm"); People v. Umali, 888 N.E.2d io46, 1051 (N.Y. 2oo8) (noting that objective
prong of self-defense requires jury to "consider whether a reasonable person in the defendant's
circumstances would have believed that deadly force was required").
174. Brown v. Robishaw, 922 A.2d io86, 1093 (Conn. 2007).
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or jury's decision did not reflect the common understanding of what
constituted reasonable self-defense in 1791.'
For example, would the defendant be able to assert an infringement
of his constitutional right to keep, bear, and use firearms to defend his
home and property in the following case, which raises issues involving
auxiliary rules and the reasonableness of the defendant's behavior? In
United States v. Peterson, the deceased drove to the defendant's house
with some friends to take the windshield wipers off of a wrecked car
belonging to the defendant that was parked in an alley in back of
defendant's house. , 6 The defendant came out to his backyard and he and
the deceased got into a verbal argument. 7 The defendant went back into
his house and the deceased returned to his car and was about to leave
when the defendant returned to his yard carrying a pistol."" He loaded
the pistol and shouted to the deceased, "If you move, I will shoot," and
"If you come in here I will kill you."'79 The deceased got out of his car
and yelled at the defendant, "What the hell do you think you are going to
175. One possible analogy to basing the constitutionally protected right to use firearms for self-
defense on the common law meaning and application of self-defense principles is the Court's decision
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). In Lucas, the Court held that in
order for legislation severely restricting an owner's use of his land to avoid being held to constitute a
regulatory taking, the state must demonstrate that the limitation at issue "inhere[s] in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place
upon land ownership." Id. at 1029. While the Lucas opinion seems to clearly state that statutory
overriding of common law nuisance principles will not be understood to change the "background
principles" of property law on which takings decisions will be based, it is not nearly as careful in
explaining the degree to which the evolution of common law nuisance principles will control the
determination of whether a taking has occurred. The Court did note that the Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides that "changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously
permissible no longer so." Id. at IO31. But what if developments in common law nuisance principles
reflect nothing more than a new attitude in the community regarding the balance of property rights
and public values?
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Lucas is also ambiguous on this point. One the one
hand, he seems to suggest that the majority is trapping takings doctrine in the logic of centuries-old
nuisance cases. Justice Blackmun complained,
There is nothing magical in the reasoning of judges long dead. They determined a harm in
the same way as state judges and legislatures do today. If judges in the i8th and 19th
centuries can distinguish a harm from a benefit, why not judges in the 2oth century, and if
judges can, why not legislators?
Id. at 1055 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). On the other hand, Justice Blackmun also seemed to suggest
that takings decisions can be based on new developments in nuisance law when he argues that "[tihere
simply is no reason to believe that new interpretations of the hoary common-law nuisance doctrine
will be particularly 'objective' or 'value free."' Id. While this language suggests that Blackmun sees no
reason to believe that new judicial interpretations of nuisance law deserve any greater respect than
legislative determinations that particular land uses are harmful, it also seems to acknowledge that
under the majority's analysis judicial developments in the common law of nuisance would control the
constitutional question of whether or not a taking occurs.
176. 483 F.2d 1222, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
177. Id.
178, Id.
179, Id.
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do with that.""' Then the deceased got a lug wrench out of his car and
advanced toward the defendant holding it in a raised position.8' The
defendant warned the deceased not to come any closer and when the
deceased continued to walk toward him, the defendant shot and killed
him.""
The jury convicted the defendant of manslaughter.'83 He appealed
and argued that the evidence demonstrated as a matter of law that he
was justified in using deadly force in self-defense.'8 4 In rejecting this
argument, the appellate court relied on two doctrinal limits on the right
of self-defense: the rule that a person whose affirmative conduct
provokes or incites the altercation cannot assert self-defense to justify
the use of deadly force, and the rule requiring the defendant to retreat if
he can safely do so rather than using deadly force against his assailant.' 5
The court concluded that the first rule applied because the deceased was
about to leave when the defendant came out of his house with a pistol
and re-ignited the dispute.' 86 It also held that the defendant was obliged
to retreat if he could safely do so, even though he was in the backyard of
his home-a location in which the duty to retreat is not enforced.'87 The
principle that one need not retreat if he is attacked in and around his
home may be asserted by innocent victims of assault, but not by those
whose conduct instigated the altercation.
The court's decision in this case may certainly be criticized as
providing inadequate recognition of the defendant's right to use firearms
to defend himself and his property. The question raised by Heller is
whether those criticisms raise constitutional questions that must be
adjudicated in order to sustain the defendant's conviction. '89
Finally, if a proper understanding of reasonableness constitutes the
constitutional foundation of this defense, it is arguable that appellate
courts should review decisions rejecting the defense by independently
I8o. Id.
I81. Id. at 1225-26.
182. Id. at 1226.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1224-25.
185. Id. at 1231-36.
186. Id. at 1231-34.
187. Id. at 1236-38.
188. Id. at 1231-38.
189. When courts review criminal convictions notwithstanding the defendant's claim that he or she
acted in self-defense, they focus on the lower court's legal conclusions as well as determining whether
the evidence supports the verdict. A range of issues may be raised, some of which, after Heller, may
have constitutional implications. See, e.g., Acers v, United States, 164 U.S. 388, 391-93 (1896)
(reviewing jury instructions regarding what constitutes a deadly weapon and the degree and
reasonableness of the perceived threat alleged to justify the defendant's conduct); State v. Jenewicz,
940 A.2d 269, 279-83 (N.J. 2008) (discussing whether the "victim's character trait for violence is an
essential element of a claim of self-defense" for the purpose of admitting character evidence at trial).
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examining the whole record of the trial proceedings below. Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc." provides some support for this
conclusion. In Bose, the plaintiff sued the defendant for product
disparagement.'9 ' The district court ruled in plaintiff's favor and found
that it had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that
defendant had acted with actual malice-that is, that defendant had
published false and disparaging facts about plaintiff's products with
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of its statements.'92
The Supreme Court determined that it was obliged to conduct an
independent review of the record to determine if the district court's
finding of malice was supported by clear and convincing evidence.'93 This
obligation does not require appellate courts to independently review all
findings of fact in First Amendment litigation, since many findings are
largely irrelevant to the constitutional standard applied in a case. But a
different rule applied to findings on the "dispositive constitutional issue"
in the case.'94 As the Court explained, "When the standard governing the
decision of a particular case is provided by the Constitution, this Court's
role in marking out the limits of the standard through the process of
case-by-case adjudication is of special importance."'95 Accordingly, when
the constitutionally critical findings are at issue in a First Amendment
case, "the rule of independent review assigns to judges a constitutional
responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact, whether the
factfinding function be performed in the particular case by a jury or by a
trial judge." ' 96
The Second Amendment is not the First Amendment. Nor is it clear
that the Second Amendment subsumes the right to use a firearm for self-
defense purposes. But if the use of a firearm in self-defense is to be
protected as a right, and if an analysis of the reasonableness of
defendant's conduct constitutes the core standard courts employ to
determine the validity of a self-defense claim, then leaving that question
to the discretion of trial judges and juries would seem to raise the same
concerns as leaving the question of the publisher's actual malice to a trial
judge or jury in a defamation case.'" Since independent review is
190. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
191. Id. at 488.
192. Id. at 49o-91.
193. Id. at 511.
194. Id. at 5o8.
195. Id. at 503.
196. Id. at 5oi.
197. There had been some confusion about whether the trial court's determination that a
defendant acted negligently in publishing defamatory statements (the minimum standard required by
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), to hold a defendant liable for defaming a private
figure) would also require independent review. Many courts initially concluded that independent
review was not required. See, e.g., Levine v. CMP Publ'ns, Inc., 738 F.2d 66o, 673 n.i9 (5th Cir. 1984);
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required in the latter circumstance, it should be required in the former as
well.
CONCLUSION
Whatever one thinks about the meaning of the Second Amendment,
the Court's opinion in Heller is a disturbing one. Heller raises far too
many questions to which the Court provides inadequate answers or no
answer at all. Lower courts and legislatures are left with limited
information about what constitutes a constitutionally cognizable burden
on the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense purposes. They are
provided no information at all about the standard of review that will be
applied to gun control laws in future cases.
Also, Heller raises serious questions about the meaning and utility of
originalist methodologies for interpreting the Constitution. The Court's
emphasis on uncodified goals and purposes to determine the scope of
rights, and its lack of regard for the reason that constitutional language is
included in the text, suggests a lack of commitment to the text itself. The
use of grammatical assumptions to subordinate what the Constitution
actually says to justify textually unsupported conclusions about what the
Constitution was understood to mean 200 years ago is unsettling. It is
hard to escape the dissonance between this analysis and the reality that
the Court is interpreting a document that controls the government of a
nation with over 300 million people. Fundamental rights in our society,
and public policy decisions about subjects as serious as gun control,
should be grounded in something more than the alleged understanding of
how prefatory and operative clauses were understood in 1789.
Finally, Heller raises unprecedented and difficult questions about the
constitutionalization of tort and criminal law principles related to the use
of firearms for self-defense. By insisting that the core meaning and
purpose of the right to keep and bear arms derives from a pre-
constitutional commitment to the right of self-defense, the Court seems
to have inextricably joined the two rights together. It is hard to explain
after Heller how the right to keep and bear firearms for self-defense
Landowne v. Beacon Publ'g Co., 52 N.E.2d 979, 985 (Ohio 1987); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d
713, 727-28 (Va. 1985). Other courts required independent review. See, e.g., Jadwin v. Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 492 n.21 (Minn. 1985). In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the
Supreme Court resolved the question by indicating that the trial court's determination that the
defendant acted unreasonably in publishing defamatory material about a private figure on a matter of
public concern would be subject to independent review. 497 U.S. 1, 2o-21 (199o); see also Ledoux v.
Nw. Publ'g, Inc., 521 N.W.2d 59, 69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen
Record Corp., 655 A.2d 417, 423 (N.J. 1995). The growing realization by courts that conclusions
regarding publisher negligence in private-figure defamation actions must be subject to independent
review supports the argument that similar independent review may be required when courts decide
whether the right to use arms (that a person keeps and bears) for self-defense purposes has been
infringed.
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purposes can be rigorously protected as a matter of constitutional law
while the right to use a firearm to protect one's person, family, and home
remains subject to the discretionary determination of common law courts
and juries as to the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct. Similarly, if
the Second Amendment precludes statutory mandates that limit the
availability of firearms in the home for immediate self-defense, there is
no obvious reason why the Amendment should not also be taken into
account if negligence law seriously burdens firearm accessibility through
the threat of civil liability.
That is one of the dangers of constitutional decisions like Heller that
lack clarity and doctrinal rigor. Their potential reach may stretch much
farther than is initially apparent.
